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THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PRECLEARANCE REQUIREMENT OF
SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
John P. MacCoon *
The Voting Rights Act of 1965' has been widely hailed as the most effec-
tive civil rights legislation ever enacted.' Seeking to end racial discrimina-
tion in voting,3 Congress devised a complex array of procedural and
substantive requirements that are unique in the law.4 A central element in
this scheme is section 5 of the Act,5 which in recent years has become one
* Attorney, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice; J.D., 1974,
Columbia University. The views expressed herein are solely the author's. Since the comple-
tion of this article the author has been appointed Director of the Section 5 Unit of the Civil
Rights Division.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1976).
2. See generally Comment, Section 5. Growth or Demise of Statutory Voting Rights?,
48 Miss. L.J. 818 (1977). The Voting Rights Act is a complex statute providing several
sophisticated mechanisms to ensure enforcement of minority voting rights. It is the purpose
of this article to discuss only one of those mechanisms - enforcement actions brought pur-
suant to § 5 of the Act.
3. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted in response to decades of minority ex-
clusion from the electoral process. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-15
(1966) (discussing congressional concern over the history of tactics employed by electoral
jurisdictions to exclude minorities from voting). For a discussion of prior federal efforts to
enforce voting rights, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523, 525-50 (1973). See also Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1051 (1965).
4. See generally Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1965); Comment, Voting RightsAct of 1965, 1966 DUKE L.J. 463.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Section 5 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision . . . [covered under section 4] . . . shall
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force
or effect on . . . [the applicable date of comparison - ie., November 1, 1964 for
jurisdictions covered in 1965; November 1, 1968 for those covered in 1970; and
November 1, 1972 for those covered in 1975] . . . such State or subdivision may
institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
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of the most useful statutory tools for the enforcement of voting rights.6
Essentially, this section is designed to prohibit the implementation in cov-
ered jurisdictions of any change in the electoral process which has the po-
tential for affecting voting rights until prior approval (preclearance) is
obtained from the United States Attorney General or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.7 In obtaining preclearance for
an electoral change, the jurisdiction bears the burden of persuading the
Attorney General or the district court that the proposed change would
have neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against either ra-
cial or certain language minorities.8 Thus, in enacting section 5, Congress
has effectively reversed the usual burdens of litigation, giving potential
plaintiffs the upper hand.
In the early years after its enactment, the Voting Rights Act was rarely
employed to challenge electoral changes, partly due to a lack of certainty
regarding the scope of section 5's coverage.9 In the 1970's, however, cov-
ered jurisdictions have witnessed increasingly active administrative and ju-
dicial enforcement efforts, parallelling the continually broad
interpretations of section 5 by the federal courts. As is often the case with
civil rights statutes, now that the extent of section 5's coverage has been
guarantees set forth in section 4(0(2) [protecting certain language minorities from
denial or abridgment of their right to vote], and unless and until the court enters
such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply
with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure: Provided,
that such qualification ... may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualifi-
cation ... has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate offi-
cial of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission .... Any
action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges
in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie
to the Supreme Court.
6. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AF-
TER 25-31 (1975). See generally D. HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES:
How To USE SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2d ed. 1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
8. Since the jurisdiction must prove to the Attorney General or the District Court for
the District of Columbia that the change does not have the purpose or effect of discriminat-
ing against protected minorities, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976), a § 5 enforcement action can
thus be used to block the implementation of electoral changes until the defendant carries the
burden of proof under § 5. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973); notes 32-
36 and accompanying text infra.
9. See Proposed Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Hearings Be/ore the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 169 (1975) (testimony of J. Stanley Pottinger, Ass't Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]. See also Roman, Section 5 of the Vot-




more clearly delineated, the focus of litigation is beginning to shift to re-
medial issues.'"
This article will trace the development of section 5 litigation from its
earlier stages, when coverage questions predominated, to the present, in
which relief questions are coming to the fore. Practical considerations in
filing section 5 enforcement actions will also be discussed in order to pro-
vide a useful source for attorneys who wish to avail their clients of its pro-
tection, particularly in view of the many changes in electoral systems that
will take place in connection with the reapportionments of election dis-
tricts following the 1980 census.''
I. SECTION 5 COVERAGE
Jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5
when they exhibit certain characteristics chosen by Congress as triggers for
the Act's coverage. Specifically, section 4(b) of the Act' 2 provides for cov-
erage when a state or political subdivision 3 has maintained a "test or de-
vice," as defined in section 4(c),' 4 and has had a voting turnout of less than
10. For example, litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 followed a
similar pattern. See Cooper, Equal Employment Law Today, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REV. 263, 263-79 (1973).
11. See generally Note, Group Representation and Race- Conscious Apportionment: The
Roles of States and the Federal Courts, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1847 (1978).
The Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division maintains a mailing list of interested
persons to whom a weekly listing of current § 5 submissions is sent. Anyone may be added
to this list free of charge upon request. Through this means, jurisdictions can be monitored
by private parties for compliance. Comments on the merits of § 5 submissions from anyone
wishing to make them are welcomed by the § 5 Unit of the Voting Section. See Procedure
for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.12-.13
(1978). Requests to be included on the mailing list and comments on pending § 5 submis-
sions should be addressed to: Section 5 Unit, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.
It should also be noted that the Voting Rights Act was amended in 1975 to provide, at the
court's discretion, for the award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in voting rights litiga-
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(e) (1976). See Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976).
13. A "political subdivision" as defined by the Act is either a county or, if the county
does not register voters, any other local voter-registering entity. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(2)
(1976).
14. Section 4(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976), defines "test or device" as:
[a]ny requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for vot-
ing (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter,
(2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular
subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the
voucher of registered voters or members of any other class.
This definition of "test or device" was recently expanded to include the holding of English-
only elections, where more than five percent of the citizens of voting age are members of one
of the language minorities protected by the Act. Id § 1973b(f). These language minorities
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fifty percent of the voting age population at the time of the presidential
elections in either 1964, 1968, or 1972. In such circumstances, coverage
becomes effective upon publication of notice in the Federal Register that a
particular jurisdiction is covered. 5
Once it has been established that a geographical area - either a state or
political subdivision - is covered by section 5, two additional jurisdic-
tional questions arise. The first concerns whether a change in a law or
practice is a voting change within the meaning of section 5. The second
relates to which political sub-units within a covered jurisdiction are subject
to section 5's preclearance requirements.
A. Voting Changes Subject to Section 5 Coverage
The Supreme Court did not address the first question concerning section
5 coverage until 1969, in Allen v. State Board of Elections.'6 The issues in
Allen were whether changes from single-member districts to at-large elec-
tions,' 7 changes in candidate qualifications, changes from elective to ap-
pointive offices, and changes in the procedure for casting write-in votes fell
within the purview of section 5. Reversing the district court, the majority
held that Congress intended to include within the scope of section 5 any
include American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Spanish Americans. Id
§ 19731(c)(3). See generally Hunter, The 1975 Voting RightsAct and Language Minorities, 25
CATH. U.L. REV. 250 (1976).
For a discussion of how such devices were used to disenfranchise blacks, see Derfner,
supra note 3, at 533-34.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976). The entire states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas are covered by § 5, as well as parts of
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. A comprehensive
listing of covered jurisdictions will appear in an appendix to the forthcoming revised § 5
guidelines at 28 C.F.R. § 51.1ff (1979).
For a listing of jurisdictions covered by § 5 prior to 1975, see 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 9, at 180-81. For a listing of jurisdictions covered by § 5 as a result of the 1975 amend-
ments, see the appendix to 28 C.F.R. § 55.24 (1978). All of the Maine jurisdictions, along
with McKinley County, New Mexico, Choctaw, and McCurtain Counties, Oklahoma have
removed themselves from § 5 coverage through "bail out" suits filed pursuant to § 4 of the
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976).
16. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Shortly after its enactment in 1965, the Voting Rights Act was
subjected to its first constitutional challenge in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966). The Supreme Court in Katzenbach upheld the new law as a valid exercise of Con-
gress' enforcement powers under the fifteenth amendment. See Roman, supra note 9, at
113-16. See also Christopher, supra note 4, at 15-23.
17. At-large elections are those where all residents of the political jurisdiction vote for
all representatives to a particular political body. Single-member district, or ward, elections
are those where residents of each geographical district vote only for the representative of
their district. See generally Parker, County Redistricting in Mississipi Case Studies in Racial
Gerrymandering, 44 Miss. L.J. 391 (1973).
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voting change which altered election laws "in even a minor way"" in or-
der to give section 5 the "broadest possible scope."' 9 The Court reasoned
that because each change had the "potential" for abridging the voting
rights of protected minorities, it became subject to section 5 preclearance.2"
Additionally, the Court held that the Act implied a private right of action
for individuals to enforce section 5 before a three-judge federal court.2 As
a result of this expansive interpretation of section 5 in Allen, the Attorney
General, as well as private litigants, began to employ section 5's protec-
tions more rigorously.22
Two years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the coverage of
section 5 in Perkins v. Matthews,23 in which the coverage of polling place
changes, annexations,24 and a change from single-member districts to at-
large elections" were at issue. The contested change from ward to at-large
elections had been mandated by state law prior to the statutory date from
which section 5 changes are to be measured,26 but ward elections contin-
ued to be held after that date. The lower court dismissed the action, find-
ing the changes non-discriminatory.27 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that by examining the effects of the changes, the three-judge court
had exceeded its jurisdiction which was limited to determining whether the
changes were covered and had been precleared pursuant to section 5.28
Deferring to the Attorney General,29 the Court then found all of the
changes at issue to have the "potential for racial discrimination in voting"
18. 393 U.S. at 566.
19. Id at 566-67.
20. Id at 569-71.
21. Id. at 555. For a discussion of the three-judge court requirement, see notes 83-91
and accompanying text infra.
22. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 169-71.
23. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
24. See generaly Note, Judicial Review of Municipal Annexations Under Section 5 of the
Voting RightsAct, 12 URB. L. ANN. 311 (1976).
25. See note 17 supra.
26. The date prescribed by the Act from which all election procedure changes are to be
measured for jurisdictions initially covered in 1965 is November 1, 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1976).
27. 301 F. Supp. 565, 566 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
28. 400 U.S. at 383-84. Resolution of the merits of a § 5 change is reserved to the
Attorney General and the District Court for the District of Columbia by the specific terms of
§ 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
29. See 400 U.S. at 391. In determining which changes have the potential for racial
discrimination in voting, the Court announced that it would show "great deference" to the
Attorney General's interpretation of § 5. Id The Attorney General's determinations are not
reported. Instead, they take the form of letters to submitting authorities and are made avail-
able to the public in the files of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division. See 28
C.F.R. § 51.26 (1978).
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and thus were subject to section 5.30 Finally, the Court dismissed the argu-
ment that the change from ward to at-large elections was not subject to
section 5 scrutiny merely because it was mandated by state law prior to the
effective date of the Act's applicability. Looking to the election procedures
"in fact" in force or effect at the time of the attachment of section 5 cover-
age, the Court determined that the effective date of the change, for section
5 purposes, was that of actual implementation, rather than the date when it
was required to be instituted under state law.
3'
The Supreme Court next addressed the scope of section 5 in Georgia v.
United States,32 where the change in question was reapportionment of the
state legislature. The Court found that by extending the coverage of sec-
tion 5 for another five years in 1970, Congress had ratified the expansive
interpretation given section 5 in Allen and Perkins.33 Again, the Court
held that section 5 covered the electoral change at issue by applying the
principle that coverage turns upon the given change's "potential" for
abridging minority voting rights.34 In addition, the Court reaffirmed both
the constitutionality of section 535 and Congress' allocation of the burden
of proof to the covered jurisdiction in obtaining section 5 preclearance.36
This pattern of broad inclusivity in coverage interpretations has contin-
ued unabated. The recent case of Dougherty County, Georgia, Board of
Education v. White,3 7 concerned a rule adopted by the local board of edu-
cation mandating that teachers and other public employees take unpaid
leave while running for public office. The three-judge district court below
had found the rule to have a potential for discriminating - conceivably by
narrowing the field of candidates from which minorities could choose -
and therefore covered by section 5.38 The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision by a five-to-four margin after noting the "consist-
30. 400 U.S. at 394-95.
31. Id. at 388-89.
32. 411 U.S. 526 (1973). The electoral change in issue involved a reapportionment of
the State House of Representatives which would have significantly decreased the number of
electoral districts throughout the state and in many cases have altered the number of repre-
sentatives per district. The Attorney General objected to the plan after being unable to
conclude that such a plan would not have a discriminatory effect on voting. A three-judge
district court for the Northern District of Georgia found the proposed change to be within
the scope of § 5 and granted an injunction which prevented the reapportionment from being
implemented. See United States v. Georgia, 351 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
33. 411 U.S. at 533.
34. Id at 534-35.
35. Id at 535.
36. Id. at 538-39.
37. 99 S. Ct. 368 (1978).
38. Id. at 374.
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ently expansive constructions of section 5" emanating from the Court, the
implicit congressional ratification in twice extending the Act in 1970 and
1975, 39 and the Attorney General's inclusive regulations.4" Although
stressing the impact of the rule on the electoral process as justification for
its inclusion,4 the majority appears to have limited coverage only to those
changes explicitly connected to that process. The Court observed that the
board of education's rule was "not a neutral personnel practice governing
all forms of absenteeism. Rather, it specifically addressed the electoral
process, singling out candidacy for elective office as a disabling activity."42
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart, Justice Powell argued that the employment rule was insufficiently
related to voting to qualify as a "standard, practice, or procedure with re-
spect to voting" within the meaning of section 5.43 Justice Powell observed
that, given the majority's attention to indirect impact, few if any state or
local enactments would escape section 5 coverage."
Indeed, the parameters of section 5 coverage are still not completely de-
fined. If mere potential impact on the electoral process is the test, then
section 5's coverage may be expansive to a degree that some would con-
sider excessive. Zoning changes, for example, can fence out minority vot-
ers just as effectively as gerrymandering of political district lines.
Likewise, the location of housing projects and educational facilities could
also have consequences for minority voting strength.45 Mere impact on the
political process as the defining principle for section 5 coverage, therefore,
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
40. 99 S. Ct. at 373. The § 5 guidelines, promulgated by the Attorney General in 1971,
provide that "[a]ll changes affecting voting, even though the change appears to be minor or
indirect . . . must either be submitted to the Attorney General or be made subject to an
action for declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia." 28
C.F.R. § 51.4(a) (1978). The Court reaffirmed that the Attorney General's interpretation is
entitled to "particular deference." 99 S. Ct. at 373.
41. Id at 374.
42. Id at 373. Note that the change must be in a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting" to be covered by § 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Personnel changes among
those individuals whose responsibilities impinge upon the electoral process, although poten-
tially impacting upon minority voting rights, have never been construed by the Attorney
General as being a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." See, e.g.,
Beatty v. Esposito, 439 F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (political committee chairman's
changing of election inspectors not a change covered by § 5).
43. 99 S. Ct. at 377 (emphasis added).
44. 1d. at 380.
45. The Department of Justice has never taken a position on whether zoning changes
and the location of housing projects fall within § 5 coverage. Were such changes subject to
preclearance, however, the administrative resources currently available for handling § 5 sub-
missions could well be taxed to the breaking point. Currently the Justice Department's staff
of 11 § 5 analysts handle an average of about 50-75 submissions per week. Interview with D.
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could lead to a slippery slope down which falls nearly everything that a
political jurisdiction does. Congress probably did not intend section 5 to
become such an all-encompassing mechanism.
Apparently to avoid this result, the Dougherty County majority placed
significant weight on the language of the personnel rule explicitly relating
to candidacy for political office, that is, to the electoral process itself.46
The test of coverage thus appears to be governed by two questions. First,
does the type of change at issue have the potential to affect voting rights?
Second, is the change within the bounds of the electoral process? If the
answer to both questions is in the affirmative, the case law suggests that the
change is covered by section 5. Importantly, this test is compatible with
Congress' basic intent to protect the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment
through section 5 preclearance.47
B. Jurisdictions Subject to Section 5 Coverage
For over ten years after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act there
was virtually no litigation concerning the jurisdictional entities covered by
section 5. The first case addressing this area to reach the Supreme Court
was United States v. Board of Commissioners.48 Sheffield, Alabama, a city
that did not conduct voter registration, argued that it was not subject to
section 5 requirements because the Act, by its own terms, applies only to
"states and political subdivisions." Section 14(c)(2) of the Act 49 defines
"political subdivision" as a county or other political entity which conducts
voter registration. In rejecting Sheffield's contention, the Supreme Court
held that this definition is relevant only for purposes of determining geo-
graphical coverage where a whole state is not covered. The Court further
noted that both congressional intent and the Attorney General's interpre-
tation of the Act supported the proposition that all political entities within
a covered state or political subdivision are subject to preclearance when
they implement changes affecting voting.5° Since Sheffield is geographi-
cally within Alabama, a covered state, the Court concluded that it was
Hunter, then Attorney Advisor, Section 5 Unit, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division,
United States Dep't of Justice (March 20, 1979).
For a list of some common changes in the electoral process which the Attorney General
deems covered by § 5, see 28 C.F.R. § 51.4(c) (1978). See also Dougherty County, Ga., Bd.
Of Educ. v. White, 99 S. Ct. 368, 373 (1978) (reciting list of electoral changes held covered
under § 5).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 373.
47. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 388 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966).
48. 435 U.S. 110 (1978). This case is commonly referred to as the Sheffield decision.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(c)(2) (1976).
50. 435 U.S. at 117-35.
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subject to section 5 requirements.5"
To date, the only other Supreme Court case concerning the kinds of
jurisdictions subject to section 5 is Dougherty County.52 The board of edu-
cation in Dougherty County contended that it was not within section 5's
coverage because it did not conduct elections. The Court found the Shef-
field decision dispositive, however, reaffirming the principle that any polit-
ical entity within a covered area - state or political subdivision - is
covered if it conducts any function impacting upon the electoral process.53
Since the school board had promulgated a rule concerning candidacy
qualifications,54 and since it was located within a covered state, it was
found to be subject to section 5.55
A related coverage question involves the situation where a state or other
political unit, not itself covered by section 5, exercises some electoral con-
trol over a subunit, such as a county that is covered by section 5.56 This
was the case in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,57 in which a reappor-
tionment plan enacted by the state of New York constituted the challenged
change in the election process. Although Kings, New York, and Bronx
Counties are specifically covered by section 5, the state of New York is not.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court confirmed the apparent understanding of
all parties that the state statute was subject to section 5 review insofar as it
affected the covered counties.
58
Although the question has not reached the Supreme Court, the lower
courts are divided on whether political parties are subject to the require-
51. Id at 124-29. See also Hereford Independent School Dist. v. Bell, 454 F. Supp. 143
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (following the Sheffield decision in holding that cities and school districts
in Texas - a covered state - are covered by § 5).
52. Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, 99 S. Ct. 368 (1978). See text ac-
companying notes 37-46 supra.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 375-76. The Court, in Sheffield, declared that § 5 coverage extends to
"all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdic-
tions, not only to counties or to whatever units of state government perform the function of
registering voters." 435 U.S. at 118.
54. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 376.
56. A variant of this situation exists in South Dakota where, for example, Todd County
- an unorganized county - is covered by § 5, while Tripp County - an attached, orga-
nized county exercising electoral control over the unorganized county (Todd) - is not cov-
ered. The State of South Dakota also exercises some electoral control over covered counties,
but is not itself covered.
57. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See generally Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, and
The Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571 (1978).
58. 430 U.S. at 149. See also Clayton v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 317 F.
Supp. 915 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (North Carolina statute extending prohibition against election-
eering at the polling place held subject to § 5 preclearance in covered counties).
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ments of section 5.59 The coverage of political parties, at least as to pri-
mary elections, would appear clearly mandated by the Act's definition of
"vote," which specifically mentions party primaries, as well as general elec-
tions.60 The territorial approach to coverage confirmed by the Court in
Sheffield and Dougherty County suggests that all political entities exercis-
ing state action to control any aspect of the electoral process within a cov-
ered geographical area are covered, including political parties. Although
the Department of Justice has always considered parties to be covered,6'
few submissions have been received from them under section 5.62
C. Court- Ordered Reapportionment Plans
Court-ordered reapportionment plans and other court-ordered electoral
changes are the only exceptions to the rule requiring preclearance for
changes effected in jurisdictions subject to section 5. This exemption for
court-ordered changes originated in Connor v. Johnson,6 3 where, after
striking down a reapportionment plan designed by the Mississippi legisla-
ture, the district court fashioned its own reapportionment plan for the en-
tire state.6 4 On appeal, the Supreme Court, for unstated reasons, simply
held section 5 to be inapplicable to court-ordered plans.65
Although it was clear in the wake of Johnson that changes designed and
ordered by a federal court would be characterized as "court-ordered," the
exact parameters of this category of exempt plans remained undefined.
59. Compare Williams v. Democratic Party, No. 16286 (N.D. Ga. April 6, 1972), a/f'd
mem., 409 U.S. 809 (1972); United States v. Democratic Exec. Comm., No. 6047-70 (S.D.
Ala. Dec. 22, 1970) (holding political parties not subject to § 5 preclearance requirements)
with MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wilson v. North Carolina Bd.
of Elections, 317 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D.N.C. 1970) (holding political parties covered by § 5).
See also Freed v. Feuer, No. 75 Civ. 3285 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1975) (dicta citing MacGuire
with approval). Note that all of these decisions antedate the Sheffield and Dougherty County
cases.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (1976).
61. Interview with D. Hunter, then Attorney Advisor, Section 5 Unit, Voting Section,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice (March 20, 1979).
62. For example, § 5 records (as of March 20, 1979) reveal that only 18 submissions
have been received from political parties outside of the state of Texas. See generally Case
Comment, MacGuire P. Amos." Application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to Political
Parties, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 208 (1973) (suggesting criteria for determining
which actions of political parties are governmental in nature and should be covered by § 5
and which are private and thus should not).
63. 402 U.S. 690 (1971) (per curiam).
64. The reapportionment plan of the Mississippi legislature was ruled unconstitutional
because it allowed impermissibly large variations in the number of persons distributed
among the House and Senate districts. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Miss.
1971).
65. 402 U.S. at 691.
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The next Supreme Court discussion of this exception appeared in East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall,66 where, in a footnote, the Court
indicated that defendant-drawn plans, made effective solely by the order of
a federal district court, are also to be considered "court-ordered" and thus
exempt from section 5.
The definition of court-ordered plans has been most recently refined in
Wise v. Livscomb.67 In Lipscomb, the district court had determined that
Dallas' at-large election system unconstitutionally diluted minority voting
rights by denying minorities fair access to the political process.68 The dis-
trict court then "gave the City of Dallas an opportunity to perform its duty
to enact a constitutionally acceptable plan."69 The city responded by pass-
ing an ordinance reapportioning the city into single-member districts. Al-
though the district court approved the plan, the Supreme Court found the
plan to be legislative rather than judicial, and thus not exempt from sec-
tion 5.70 The Court distinguished East Carroll Parish by noting that the
school board in that case could not have purported to act legislatively since
the relevant state enabling legislation had been previously objected to by
the Attorney General under section 5. The school board in East Carroll
Parish merely submitted a plan to the district court which that court's or-
der alone rendered effective.7 In contrast, the city of Dallas had the legis-
lative power to enact a reapportionment plan and had exercised that
power.72 Thus, whether a plan will be considered court-ordered and ex-
empt from section 5 coverage, is dependent, not upon who draws the plan,
but upon the source of the authority by which it becomes effective. If
judicial, rather than legislative authority enacts the plan, then section 5
does not apply, at least where federal courts are concerned.
Electoral changes ordered by state courts, like federal court-ordered
changes, have been held by lower courts not to be within the scope of
66. 424 U.S. 636, 638-39 n.6 (1976) (per curiam).
67. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
68. 399 F. Supp. 782, 790 (N.D. Tex. 1975). The election requirement originally con-
tested in Lipscomb was a city charter provision which required all city council members to
be elected on an at-large basis. After considering the city's past history of discrimination
and the customary restricted access of minority voters, to the process of slating candidates,
the district court found that this procedure unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of
minorities, most of whom were located in a small definable area of the city. Id
69. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
70. 437 U.S. at 546. In finding the City Council's revised election scheme to be legisla-
tive, the Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of it as court-ordered.
See Lipscomb v. Wise, 551 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. 437 U.S. at 545.
72. Id at 545-46.
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section 5. In Gangemi v. Sclafani,73 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit determined without an articulated analysis that state
court orders, like those of a federal court, are not subject to section 5. Sim-
ilarly, in Webber v. J'Vite, 4 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas construed section 5 to cover only state legisla-
tive enactments, not state judicial decisions which result in voting changes.
The Webber court found no indication in either the legislative history of
section 5 or in the Attorney General's guidelines that state court-ordered
changes are within section 5's reach.75 Additionally, the court saw practi-
cal problems in requiring state executives to submit state judicial rulings to
section 5 preclearance, because of the independence of the two branches
and the concomitant potential for disagreement between them.7 6
In Williams v. Sclafani,7 7 the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York agreed with Webber that problems of comity, if
not constitutionality, would result from requiring state executives to
preclear state judicial decisions over which they have no control.78 The
Williams court, however, expressly indicated that it was speaking only of
state courts acting judicially in construing statutes and that state court
quasi-legislative actions, such as annexation proceedings, would not be ex-
empt from section 5.79
The exemption of state court-ordered changes creates an unwarranted
gap in section 5 coverage. To the extent that a state can shift responsibility
for changes detrimental to minority voting rights to its judiciary, it can
evade section 5 scrutiny, thereby frustrating congressional intent. The ra-
tionale offered by the lower courts for this exemption is unconvincing.
The mere absence of specific language addressing state court-ordered
changes in the Attorney General's section 5 guidelines, as well as the Act's
legislative history, should be accorded little significance. The section 5
guidelines explicitly disavow completeness in listing covered changes.8"
Furthermore, Congress cannot reasonably be expected to have specifically
foreseen and mentioned every electoral change which section 5 was in-
73. 506 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1974).
74. 422 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
75. Id at 427.
76. Id. at 427-28.
77. 444 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
78. Id. at 904.
79. Id at 903. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 359 (1975); Perkins v.
Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) (applying § 5 to annexations in which state courts partici-
pated in a quasi-legislative capacity pursuant to state law but where the issue of requiring
state executives to submit state judicial decisions under § 5 was not raised).
80. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.4(c) (1978).
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tended to cover. The possible conflict between state executive and state
judicial interests relied upon by the lower courts is likewise unpersuasive.
Although there is a potential for conflict between state executive and legis-
lative branches, changes of legislative origin are routinely submitted under
section 5 and defended by the state executive. By its express terms section
5 seeks to afford federal preclearance protection from state action affecting
voting."' It makes sense to exempt federal court action since state action
was the only target of coverage. It is unreasonable, however, to exempt a
state court's order, for it is merely another manifestation of state action.
II. THE SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Having determined that a jurisdiction covered by section 5 has imple-
mented an unprecleared change, a private party or the Attorney General
may then file suit in federal court to obtain relief.82 In filing a section 5
enforcement suit, one must bear in mind several peculiar features of such
an action.
A. Three-Judge Court Requirement
Section 5 explicitly requires the convening of a three-judge district court
in the district where the covered jurisdiction is located or where venue is
otherwise proper.83 It should be noted, however, that in Broussard v. Pe-
rez84 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit construed
section 5 to allow a preclearance enforcement action to be decided by a
single judge where the issues presented are "insubstantial" or "frivo-
lous."85 In deviating from the strict three-judge requirement, the Fifth
Circuit relied on Bailey v. Patterson86 where the Supreme Court had
carved out a similar exception for a more general three-judge court stat-
ute," requiring a three-judge court in cases where injunctions are sought
to restrain the enforcement of state statutes on constitutional grounds.
Finding the policy of lessening federal-state friction equivalent in both
statutes,88 the Broussard court applied the Supreme Court's Bailey excep-
tion to the three-judge court requirement of section 5. The court equated
8 1. See note 5 supra.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d)(1976) (authorizing the Attorney General to file suit under
§ 5). See also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (the Act implies a private
right of action for individuals to enforce § 5).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
84. 572 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 610 (1978).
85. 572 F.2d at 1118.
86. 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958) (repealed 1976 and replaced by § 2284).
88. 572 F.2d at 1118.
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"frivolous" or "insubstantial" issues with those which are "controlled by
Supreme Court precedent or which cannot be seriously contested."89 Al-
though state courts have entertained section 5 enforcement actions,9" the
three-judge federal court requirement would appear to deny state courts
the jurisdiction necessary to hear these disputes.9'
B. Jurisdictional Limitations of Section 5 Actions
The jurisdiction of a three-judge court in an enforcement action brought
pursuant to section 5 is rather narrow. The court may decide only whether
the political jurisdiction and the change in question are covered, and if so,
whether the change has been precleared.92 Any inquiry into the merits of
the change is reserved to the Attorney General or the District Court for the
District of Columbia.93 Moreover, where a covered change has not been
precleared, federal courts may not address the merits of the new electoral
device under any other federal or state statute.94 The three-judge court's
jurisdiction is circumscribed further by the prohibition against judicial re-
view of any Attorney General determinations relating to the merits of the
voting change at issue. 9'
When a successful enforcement action brought solely under section 5
invalidates an unprecleared change, the result is restoration of the electoral
system which existed prior to the change.96 If there are legal deficiencies
in this prior system, they may not be attacked under the court's section 5
jurisdiction. A separate basis for jurisdiction must be asserted.97 For ex-
ample, if a malapportioned legislative body redistricted, and the redistrict-
ing failed to obtain section 5 preclearance, complete relief would have to
be achieved by a complaint alleging two separate counts - one under sec-
tion 5, and one under the fourteenth amendment and title forty-two of the
89. Id at 1119. Accord, United States v. St. Landry Parish School Bd., 601 F.2d 859
(5th Cir. 1979).
90. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Simpson, 350 So. 2d 998 (Miss. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934
(1978); Williams v. Town of Many, 350 So. 2d 224 (La. Ct. of App. 1977).
91. See Beatty v. Esposito, 411 F. Supp. 107, 110-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (mem.) (state
supreme court justice has no power to determine whether alleged practice was subject to the
Voting Rights Act).
92. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383 (1971). See text accompanying note 28
supra.
93. Id at 385. See text accompanying note 102 infra.
94. See Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975) (per curiam) (no cognizable legal entity
exists to be attacked under any other statutory or constitutional provision unless and until §
5 preclearance has been obtained).
95. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977); Harris v. Bell, 562 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); City of Rome v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1978) (mem.).
96. See United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1977) (per curiam).




If a three-judge court is convened in a section 5 enforcement action and
the prechange electoral system is also attacked upon an independent juris-
dictional basis, a question arises as to how the court should proceed. Pre-
sumably, the section 5 count must be heard first. 99 If it is determined that
the change is legally unenforceable, the claim against the prechange elec-
toral system then may be considered. Such claims would ordinarily be
tried by a single judge to whom the three-judge court would remand the
suit. A three-judge court might, however, exercise ancillary jurisdiction to
decide such a claim if there is a close relationship between the section 5
claim and the single-judge claim."l°
Interestingly, two New York decisions have held that a good faith alle-
gation of racial discrimination is necessary to state a claim in a section 5
enforcement action, apparently in an effort to prevent the use of section 5
for purely political purposes where there is no legitimate question of dis-
crimination against protected minorities.' °' Such a requirement, however,
is contrary to the rule established in Perkins, which bars consideration of
the merits of a section 5 change by any forum other than the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General.'
0 2
III. RELIEF IN SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
An area of growing concern to the courts is the fashioning of an appro-
priate form of relief in section 5 enforcement litigation. The relief sought
in these actions may be either prospective - the court enjoining the future
implementation of the proposed change, or retrospective - the court rem-
edying the past implementation of the change. Since most voting changes
are implemented in elections, prospective relief usually consists of the
court enjoining future elections which would implement an unprecleared
change. Retrospective relief, on the other hand, usually involves the court
overturning or otherwise correcting the results of past elections and order-
ing new elections.103
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (allowing individuals to bring civil actions for the dep-
rivation of any rights or privileges caused by the constitutional violation).
99. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
100. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812 n.8 (1974). See also note 116 infra.
101. See Beatty v. Esposito, 439 F. Supp. 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (mem.); Gangemi v.
Sclafani, No. 74-C-1269 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1974), af'd, 506 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1974).
102. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
103. Not all covered changes, of course, are implemented through elections. For exam-
ple, changes in voter registration procedures are implemented independently of an election.
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
A. Prospective Relief
In a section 5 enforcement action a plaintiff may seek to enjoin a cov-
ered jurisdiction from future implementation of the challenged change,
unless and until preclearance is obtained. If implementation of a nonvali-
dated change is imminent, a preliminary injunction or temporary re-
straining order may be sought in the local federal court by the Attorney
General or by private litigants."
In weighing applications for preliminary injunctive relief, one of the fac-
tors which courts have traditionally considered is whether the plaintiff will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.° 5 Some courts
have treated violations of section 5 as per se irreparable injury.° 6 Courts
do not, however, automatically issue preliminary injunctions against the
implementation of unprecleared changes. Eleventh hour injunctive ac-
tions have failed where courts deemed that the equities warranted denial
of such relief.'0 7 Where election procedures are already in motion, other
courts have on occasion allowed elections implementing such changes to
go forward but have enjoined certification of the results of the elections
pending a final determination of the section 5 claim on the merits.'0 8
Courts do, however, often enjoin the holding of impending elections be-
cause of noncompliance with section 5."°9
104. Section 12(d) of the.Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1976), specifically
authorizes preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for violations of § 5.
105. Other factors the courts will consider include the likelihood of success on the merits,
the potential harm to the defendants, and the public interest. See, e.g., Canal Authority v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. See United States v. Board of Trustees, No. SA-78-CA-84 (W.D. Tex. March 29,
1978); Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978); Silva v. Fitch, No.
SA-76-CA-126 (W.D. Tex. April 28, 1976). See generally United States v. City of Philadel-
phia, 573 F.2d 802 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 105 (1978); Smallwood v. National Can
Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1969) (violations of a statute providing for injunctive enforcement is per se irreparable
harm). Unfortunately, many similar three-judge court decisions construing § 5 are unre-
ported and unavailable in any library reference material. Copies of these decisions can be
obtained, however, by writing the clerk of the particular federal court.
107. See Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739, 742-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (mem.).
108. Cf. Charlton County Bd. of Educ. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 530 (D.D.C. 1978)
(imminent elections implementing an unprecleared change from appointive to elective selec-
tion of the Board were not enjoined partly because of the last minute timing of the govern-
ment's suit); LeRoy v. City of Houston, No. 75-H-1731 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 1975) (city
elections enjoined pending submission of annexations to the Attorney General shortly after
§ 5 coverage attached to Texas).
109. See, e.g., Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (mem.);
Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978); United States v. Board of
Trustees, No. SA-78-CA-84 (W.D. Tex. March 29, 1978); Silva v. Fitch, No. SA-76-CA-126
(W.D. Tex. April 28, 1976); United States v. Board of Supervisors, No. 73W-48(N) (S.D.
Miss. July 1, 1975); United States v. Grenada County, No. WC 75-44-K (N.D. Miss. May 16,
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In view of the congressionally imposed responsibility upon covered ju-
risdictions to obtain preclearance of changes prior to their implementation
and the now well-established expansive scope of section 5 coverage, un-
precleared changes should ordinarily be enjoined. In Horry County v.
United States,"' for example, the three-judge court enjoined an election
that would have violated section 5 even though those who would hold over
in office as a result of the injunction were themselves elected in violation of
section 5. The court found that "the intent of section 5 is clear: black
voters are not to be made to wait through election after election under
untested and potentially discriminatory laws.""'I
At least one three-judge court has unequivocally ruled that, even on the
eve of the election, it had "no discretion to deny injunctive relief' where
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin implementation of a change previously sub-
mitted and objected to by the Attorney General."' The enjoining of such
changes whenever preliminary or temporary relief is sought should be the
norm. In the absence of this relief, covered jurisdictions are encouraged
not to comply with the statutory mandate until ordered to do so by a fed-
eral court.' 13
Once a change has been enjoined, the result is restoration of the
prechange situation. It may occur, however, that no legally viable pre-
change situation exists. For example, where a reapportionment is adjudg-
ed unconstitutional and the jurisdiction changes to a new apportionment
that fails to survive section 5 scrutiny, a legal void is created. New elec-
tions must be ordered to ensure that the jurisdiction will hold legally ac-
ceptable elections and not hold over incumbents indefinitely, which would
1975); United States v. Leake County, No. 4771 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 19, 1970). See also Per-
kins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383 (1971) (a single judge issued a temporary restraining
order which halted the election scheduled to implement unprecleared changes).
110. 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978).
Il1. Id at 996-97.
112. See United States v. County Council, No. 78-881, slip op. at 5 (D.S.C. June 6, 1978).
See also United States v. County Council, No. 78-883 (D.S.C. June 22, 1978) (decision by
same panel following the former County Council decision).
113. The court in Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (mem.),
espoused this view:
While we recognize that an injunction is a harsh measure to be utilized with care,
we are of the opinion that Congress and the Supreme Court intended injunctions
against elections to be the normal remedy afforded against defendants who attempt
to hold elections before obtaining preclearance. The threat and pressure of an in-
junction provides a strong incentive for compliance with the Act.
Id at 743. For a synthesis of the case law regarding prospective § 5 injunctive relief, see id
at 742-43.
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itself be a change subject to section 5 requirements." 4 This situation oc-
curred in Moore v. LeFlore County Board of Election Commissioners.115 In
Moore, a three-judge court allowed the impending elections to proceed on
an at-large basis while shortening the terms of those elected pursuant to a
timetable established by the court for the enactment of a constitutionally




Courts are often faced with the task of devising the proper form of retro-
spective relief in actions where an election implementing a covered change
has already been held without first having obtained section 5 preclearance.
Several factors have emerged in the developing case law bearing upon the
fashioning of appropriate relief in these circumstances.
One factor is whether or not the jurisdiction could reasonably be ex-
pected to have known that it was in violation of section 5 when it held the
election. Such was the case in Allen v. State Board of Elections," 17 where
the Supreme Court refused to void the past elections and order new ones
because of the then novel nature of the coverage issues involved. Instead,
in view of each jurisdiction's apparently unintentional violation of the Act,
the Court merely remanded the consolidated cases to the district courts
with instructions to enjoin future elections utilizing the changes unless and
until section 5 approval was obtained." 8 In Perkins v. Matthews," 9 the
Supreme Court identified several other factors to be considered by the
three-judge district court in determining the proper relief. Included were
the nature of the changes involved and whether or not federal preclearance
had been sought. Presumably, the implementation of a minor change
without section 5 preclearance, such as the movement of a single polling
place a short distance, would not justify voiding the election involved.
Conversely, a more substantial change, particularly one which might have
changed the outcome of the election, would justify overturning the election
and ordering a new one. Where no submission of the implemented change
has been made under section 5, the Court in Perkins suggested that it may
be appropriate to give the jurisdiction a period of time in which to seek
114. The theory that "holding over" incumbents as a result of § 5 enforcement is itself a §
5 change (tantamount to lengthening terms of office) has not yet been tested in any court.
115. 351 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
116. Id. at 852-53.
117. 393 U.S. 544, 571-72 (1969). See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
118. 393 U.S. at 572.
119. 400 U.S. 379 (1971). See generally text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
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preclearance and to order a new election only if preclearance is not ob-
tained. 2o
In Berry v. Doles,12 1 the most recent section 5 case discussing retrospec-
tive relief, the Supreme Court adopted the remedial approach suggested by
Perkins. The covered change was a statute staggering the terms of a local
political body implemented in an election without preclearance.' 22 The
lower court enjoined the future enforcement of the statute but refused to
set aside the past elections in light of the technical nature of the changes
and the absence of discriminatory intent. 123 The Supreme Court re-
manded the case and directed the lower court to enter an order allowing
the covered jurisdiction thirty days to submit the change pursuant to sec-
tion 5.124 The Court, with two Justices dissenting, 125 noted that if
preclearance were either denied or not sought, the district court might then
properly order all members of the political body to be elected simultane-
ously at the general election, which was, at the time of the Court's decision,
four months away.1
26
Although the factors described in Allen and Perkins have justified previ-
ously held elections which implemented unprecleared changes in certain
circumstances, the ordering of new elections to cure section 5 violations in
past elections has been a familiar form of relief. In United States v. Gar-
ner,127 a small Georgia municipality implemented numbered post provi-
sions and a majority vote requirement without seeking preclearance. The
three-judge district court, construing section 5 strictly, voided the previous
elections and ordered new ones without the unprecleared changes.' 28 Sim-
ilar relief was granted after an election in United States v. Kemper
County,129 in which the county had converted from single-member to at-
large districting without section 5 validation. In United States v. Mer-
iwether County,'3 ° special elections were ordered in the wake of a county
120. Id at 396-97.
121. 438 U.S. 190 (1978).
122. Id. at 190-91.
123. Id at 191.
124. Id at 192-93.
125. Id at 202-03 (Rehnquist and Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
126. Id at 193. The change was subsequently precleared by the Attorney General.
127. 349 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (per curiam).
128. Id at 1056. See also Cantu v. Board of Trustees, No. 2-79-32 (N.D. Tex. March 20,
1979) (ordering a new election to remedy a past § 5 violation).
129. No. 74-65(c) (S.D. Miss. Nov. 21, 1974).
130. No. 74-35N (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1974). See also United States v. Board of Comm'rs,
No. 76-M-1086 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 1979) (on remand from the Supreme Court, the court
gave the city six months to obtain preclearance for its newly devised election system or face
specially ordered elections to be held under the prechange electoral system).
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election, where, despite a section 5 objection by the Attorney General, the
county nevertheless switched to at-large districting and conducted the elec-
tion. A virtually identical situtation was remedied in this manner in United
States v. Twiggs County. 13l
Still an open question is whether preelection diligence requirements,
normally applied to plaintiffs seeking retrospective electoral relief, are ap-
plicable in section 5 actions. In Toney v. White,'32 the court ruled that a
plaintiff is foreclosed from seeking retrospective relief if the plaintiff had
the opportunity to contest the violation in preelection adjudication but
failed to do SO. 13 3 The apparent basis of this policy is to give both the
courts and the jurisdictions concerned a chance to remedy illegalities
before the election occurs, thereby avoiding the unnecessary public ex-
pense and inconvenience of holding a second election. In view of section
5's basic policy of placing the burden of litigation on covered jurisdictions
rather than on plaintiffs' 34 and the congressional mandate that changes be
legally unenforceable until preclearance is obtained, 35 ordinary preelec-
tion diligence requirements are inappropriate in the section 5 context. The
duty should rest upon the covered jurisdiction to seek preclearance and to
bring the change forward for preelection adjudication. When it fails to do
so and holds an election implementing a change, it should properly be held
to act at its own risk.
Besides preelection diligence, recent case law outside of the section 5
context, has suggested two other possible prerequisites for seeking retro-
spective relief in section 5 enforcement actions: that the electoral change
have affected the outcome of the election; and that the electoral illegality
be "gross, spectacular and wholly indefensible." 1
36
These requirements are likewise inapposite in regard to section 5 en-
forcement actions. In view of the burden of obtaining preclearance which
the Act places squarely upon the covered jurisdictions, it would undermine
131. No. 2825 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 1973). In United States v. County Comm'rs, 425 F.
Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 924 (1977), the three-judge district court
allowed the scheduled election to proceed with the unsubmitted change to at-large elections
provided the defendants agreed to: (1) file a § 5 submission with the Attorney General
within 15 days; (2) if objected to, file with the District of Columbia District Court for a § 5
declaratory judgment within 30 days of the objection; (3) advise the court within 60 days of
the Attorney General's or District of Columbia District Court's disposition; (4) hold a new
election promptly if federal preclearance is not granted. Id at 436-37.
132. 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
133. Id at 314. See also Coalition for Educ. v. Board of Elections, 495 F.2d 1090 (2d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
134. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334-35.
136. See, e.g., Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1973).
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the congressional scheme to require the plaintiff to carry the burden of
proving that the election results might have been affected or that the viola-
tion was "gross, spectacular and wholly indefensible."' 137 Moreover, to
place such a burden on plaintiffs would encourage covered jursidictions to
violate section 5 quietly so that they may avoid preelection injunctive en-
forcement actions in the hope that the plaintiffs would be unable to meet
their burden of proof, thereby causing any postelection enforcement action
to be unsuccessful. Furthermore, to place in issue matters concerning the
merits of the section 5 violation - whether the outcome of the election
may have been affected, or whether the discrimination was gross - in-
volves the three-judge court in matters which the Supreme Court has held
to be reserved to the Attorney General or the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.'38 If, however, these issues are held by the
courts to be proper considerations in allowing retrospective relief, '39 at the
very least it would be appropriate to require the covered jurisdiction to
carry the burden of proving that the election results could not have been
affected, and that the violation of section 5 was not "gross, spectacular and
wholly indefensible."
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the growing recognition of the usefulness of section 5 as a
means for enforcing the voting rights of racial and language minorities,
section 5 litigation is on the rise. Since the Act's coverage was extended for
seven years by the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, it will apply
to the many electoral changes that will attend the traditional decennial
reapportionments of covered states and local jurisdictions following the
1980 census. The impact of section 5 thus can be expected to grow. Civil
rights advocates have a powerful tool at their disposal.
137. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 121 (1978). See also Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1973).
138. For a discussion of the jurisdictional limitations of § 5 enforcement actions, see text
accompanying notes 92-100 supra.
139. The Supreme Court appears to have indicated that the impact of the § 5 violation
on the outcome of the election might be a valid consideration in granting retrospective relief.
See, e.g., Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190, 192 (1978) (noting without comment the plaintifis
claim that the outcome of the election had been affected by the § 5 violation). See also the
discussion of Perkins in text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
In Charbonnet v. Braden, No. 78-1238 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 1978), sum. aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W.
3782 (U.S. June 4, 1979), a three-judge court refused to overturn an election which imple-
mented an objected to polling place change. The court found Toney wholly applicable to § 5
enforcement actions without any discussion of its rationale, inexplicably characterized the
impact of the change on the election results as political rather than racial, and refused to
disturb the election results.
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